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NOTES
THE FEDERAL COLLECTION OF STATE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES
I. Introduction
The recent economic recession and the rapidly escalating costs
of many governmental services have compelled state and local gov-
ernments to reevaluate their tax structures.' Although high expendi-
tures are a primary cause of financial difficulties, governments on
all levels find themselves in the perplexing position of having to
increase their social services while their revenue sources decrease.2
States have traditionally relied on taxes to finance the expansion
of services, 3 and most states have enacted broad-based income taxes
1. For a discussion of the financial problems of state and local govern-
ments, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMIrrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
92 CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE STATE AND LocAL FISCAL
ASSISTANCE ACT AND THE FEDERAL-STATE TAX COLLECTION ACT OF 1972, at 6
(Comm. Print 1973) (hereiriafter cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION); E. FRIED,
A. RIVLIN, C. SCHULTZE & N. TEETERS, SETWING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE
1974 BUDGET 8-10 (1973).
2. Governments are in the business of providing services, not profit
maximization. Certain services are so essential that they must be provided
despite the costs involved. Governments with narrow tax bases are being
placed in financial squeezes which may not be solved simply with reduc-
tions in nonessential services and the enactment of additional taxes. For
an analysis of New York City's financial problems in light of this discus-
sion, see Stern, Danger of City Fiscal Crisis Seems Real, but Will Budget
Retrenchment or New Taxes Resolve It?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1974, at 27,
col. 1. During economic recessions the demand for public assistance in-
creases while consumption and income, two major tax sources, fall. In 1971
the consumption and personal income taxes accounted for 31.1% of total
state revenue sources and 48.48% of total state tax receipts. These amounts
were derived from sources in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FIS-
CAL FEDERALISM 31 (1973-74 ed.).
3. Rothenberg, A New Look in State Finances: Tax Reduction and
Restructured Tax Systems, 27 NAT. TAX J. 175 (1974).
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which yield additional revenue without raising tax rates.' Federal
grant-in-aid5 and revenue sharing funds' also increase a state's fiscal
resources and relieve pressure for additional taxes.7 Revenue Shar-
ing was intended to replace restricted grants-in-aid and permit state
and local governments to receive federal funds pursuant to an allo-
cation basis which rewarded state and local tax efforts.8
4. For a discussion of the development of state personal income taxes
see L. ECKER-RACZ, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF STATE-LOCAL FINANCE
43-44 (1970). Income taxes provide additional revenue without increasing
rates during periods of economic growth due to an increase in the base of
the tax. See, e.g., J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: Eco-
NOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 321 (1973). The yield of progressive income
taxes increases at a more rapid rate than the increase in the income base.
Id. Moreover, inflation does not cause a progressive income tax to impose
an onerous burden on the lower income groups. See Beer & Walther,
Inflation and the Progressivity of the Federal Individual Income Tax, 10
CALIF. W.L. REV. 537 (1974).
5. For a good introduction to the use of grants-in-aid in a federal sys-
tem, see Ervin, Federalism and Federal Grants-In-Aid, 43 N.C.L. REV. 487
(1965). An exhaustive compendium of sources in this area may be found
in LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE FOR THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FEDERAL
GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1964-1969 (Comm. Print
1970).
6. The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (Revenue Shar-
ing) provided for the distribution of federal tax revenue to the states. 31
U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. II, 1972). For excellent discussions of Revenue
Sharing in light of federal-state fiscal relations see 0. STOLZ, REVENUE
SHARING: LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1974) [hereinafter cited as STOLZ];
Calaba, The Analysis and Application of the State and Local Fiscal Assis-
tance Act of 1972, 28 TAX L. REV. 375 (1973) [hereinater cited as Calaba];
Comment, The Revenue Sharing Act of 1972: United and Untraceable
Dollars from Washington, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 276 (1973); 2 FORDHAM URBAN
L.J. 621 (1974).
7. Rothenberg, A New Look in State Finances: Tax Reduction and
Restructured Tax Systems, 27 NAT. TAX J. 175, 176 (1974).
8. See GENERAL EXPLANATION 41-44. Although the allocation under Rev-
enue Sharing is determined in part by the local tax effort a recipient may
use Revenue Sharing funds to permit tax relief. In 1973, 18 states expected
to use some of the funds to provide some form of tax relief; 14 of these
states maintained that property tax reduction was their primary goal. In
16 states officials expected Revenue Sharing funds to postpone future tax
[Vol. III
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An unutilized provision of Revenue Sharing provides for the op-
tional piggybacking of state income taxes upon the federal income
tax.' The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would act as the state's
collector and enforcer. The state, however, would lose some control,
both legislatively and judicially, over its personal income tax laws.
All judicial challenges, except those involving state constitutional
questions or issues pertaining to the relationship between state and
federal governments, would be tried in federal courts."°
Revenue Sharing is a five year experiment; I piggybacking has no
time limits and appears to have been envisioned by Congress as a
long-term solution for state and local financial problems." Two or
more states, accounting for at least five percent of the, taxpayers in
the United States, must request federal collection of their individual
income taxes before the Act can take effect." If the minimum num-
ber of states adopt piggybacking, the federal government will permit
these states to utilize the national income base and relieve them of
the excessive administrative costs of collecting an income tax.
Because piggybacking could dramatically reshape a state's tax
increases. 1973 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS, REVENUE SHARING: ITS USE BY AND IMPACT ON STATE
GOVERNMENTS 21-22. "The funds for [R]evenue [S]haring are appropri-
ated out of federal income tax collections. What the recipient governments
are actually doing is sharing in the efficiency of the federal tax system
..* . . [They] should look upon [Rievenue [Siharing as a stay of execu-
tion rather than as a windfall from Uncle Sam. They should use this stay
of execution as a period in which to reflect on how better to utilize their
own resources." Calaba 426-27.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6361-65.
10. Id. § 6361(d)(1).
11. 31 U.S.C. § 1224(b)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
12. Senator Edmund S. Muskie remarked: "The second provision [of
Revenue Sharing] would offer the States the option of utilizing the machi-
nery of the Federal Government to collect State income taxes for them.
Both of these provisions are intended to encourage the States to make
better use of the progressive income tax rather than continuing to rely so
heavily on regressive taxes like the property tax and the sales tax."
Hearings on General Revenue Sharing Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 458 (1971).
13. Pub. L. No. 92-512 § 204(b) (Oct. 20, 1972), 86 Stat. 945.
1975]
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structure 4 and provide long term stability, this Note will examine
the fiscal and administrative feasibility of such a system.
II. Historical Perspective
It is generally conceded that a broad-based income tax is the most
14. Revenue Sharing, in theory, attempted to revitalize the federal
system by decentralizing the federal grant system. States and localities
enjoyed the use of federal monies in a much less restricted manner than
was possible under conditional grants. Piggybacking, however, places more
power in Washington, and seems to oppose the underlying motivation of
Revenue Sharing. This appears to be a strange formula for revitalizing
federalism unless piggybacking is viewed as a means of direct sharing in
the federal income tax base. "The most ignored aspect of Public Law 92-
512 [Revenue Sharing] is Title II, which provides for the federal collection
of state individual income taxes. If a significant number of states elect to
have the federal government collect the state income taxes, the concept of
revenue sharing could be altered dramatically. Instead of the federal gov-
ernment transferring $5 billion per year to the states and localities in the
form of a transfer payment, a transfer of a portion of the federal income
tax base directly to the states and localities would achieve the same result.
Thus, pure revenue sharing may result from this dormant provision in the
legislation. The Congressional approval of this shift in the tax base will be
difficult to obtain because it represents a further diminution in the power
of Congress. However, the long-term interests of the federal system will be
best served by sharing this efficient, progressive, and responsive tax source
with state and local governments." STOLZ 143. One potential problem with
Federal collection of state individual income taxes lies in the perception
of the taxpayers themselves. Although the federal government would only
be the agent of the states, it is feared that taxpayers would view the
piggyback tax liability as a federal tax increase and the results from this
perception could seriously impair the revenue raising capability of the
federal government. Hearings on General Revenue Sharing Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 955
(1971). Direct sharing in the federal income tax should create interest on
the part of the states in congressional changes in the base. "As a practical
matter, would this vested interest of the states restrict the freedom of
Congress to make major changes in Federal laws to carry out some new
fiscal policy? Or, would this close tie to the Federal income tax system tend
to be advantageous from the standpoint of fiscal policy in that if the states
accepted the Federal changes without revising their own tax rates, the
fiscal effects of the change would be reinforced? The alternatives involved
in these questions cannot be dismissed as insignificant." Conlon, Federal
Participation in State Tax Administration, 24 NAT. TAX J. 369, 375 (1971).
[Vol. III
productive tax at the disposal of all levels of government in the
United States.'5 The personal income tax base has been most fully
developed by the federal government; significant utilization of a
personal income tax base by state and local governments is a mod-
ern development.'" Previously, states relied upon consumption and
excise taxes, and local governments depended upon property taxes,
to finance their budgets." These narrow tax bases'8 could not sup-
port the increasingly expensive services provided by such govern-
ments.'9 Many states have therefore enacted a personal income tax,
long considered the domain of the federal government, to finance
their activities.20
In structuring their personal income tax laws, states borrowed
heavily from federal experience. 2 ' It was not long before cooperation
between federal and state collection agencies began.22 A major goal
of this cooperation is to reduce the costs of collection and enforce-
ment, 2 thereby increasing the net yield from the tax. Using both
15. See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1963); J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 53 (rev. ed. 1971); Cal-
aba 427.
16. Rothenburg, A New Look in State Finances: Tax Reduction and
Restructured Tax Systems, 27 NAT. TAX J. 175 (1974).
17. L. ECKER-RACZ, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF STATE-LOCAL
FINANCE 32-37 (1970).
18. A narrow tax base generally results in a more regressive tax struc-
ture. Crooks, Replacing Unfair State Taxes: Income Taxes as an
Alternative, PEOPLE & TAXES, Nov. 1974, at 6, col. 1.
19. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 211-13 (rev. ed. 1971).
20. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
21. See note 88 infra and accompanying text.
22. See text accompanying notes 25-47 infra.
23. For a general discussion of the compliance costs under the federal
tax system see COMMISSION TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE
FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE 13 (1973). For a more rigorous analysis, see A. OTT
& D. OH, SIMULATION OF REVENUE AND TAX STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS OF
BROADENING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX BASE, in STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX
REFORM 59 (1969).
24. The first statutory recognition of federal state cooperation in tax
administration appeared in the Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch.6, 36 Stat. 11 which
permitted state officials to examine the corporate returns of an excise tax
measured by income. This was four years prior to the ratification of the
sixteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, which authorized the
NOTES19751
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statutory and informal arrangements, states have had access to fed-
eral tax returns since the early stages of the federal income tax.25
Congressional authorization for the examination of federal tax re-
turns of non-corporate entities came with the passage of section 257
of the Revenue Act of 1926.26 This Act permitted states to review
federal tax returns at the request of state governors. 7
As the use of state income taxes increased, some states encoun-
tered problems concerning nonresidents' income derived from
sources within the state and residents' income derived from sources
outside the state. 8 These difficulties, coupled with the belief that
direct taxation of income. Turner, Federal-State Cooperation in Tax
Administration, 9 WM. & MAY L. REV. 958 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Turner]. In 1913 the present right of the states as dictated by the INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 6103(b)(1) was enacted in the Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch.16,
38 Stat. 114, which granted the governors of all states having a general
income tax access to all corporate returns or abstracts of such returns.
25. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN TAX ADMINISTRATION, SUMMARY OF REPORT A-7,
at 2 n.2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY]. The tax commissioner of
Massachusetts sent state examiners to Washington, D.C., to review federal
tax. returns as early as 1920. Id.
26. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, as amended, Act of May
29, 1928, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 795.
27. T.D. 4291, IX-1 Cum. Bull. 127 (1930) provided for the inspection
of federal income tax returns by state officers for state income tax pur-
poses. This decision was approved on June 9, 1930 by an executive order
from President Hoover, X-1 Cum. Bull. 148 (1931). At the time of the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926, Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat.
9, fifteen states were taxing either individual or corporate income or both.
Section 257 of the Revenue Act of 1926 explicitly gave states access to
federal tax information provided that the governor of a state desiring such
information requested it, and that the information would be made avail-
able subject to the rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury
and approval by the President. SUMMARY 2. Between January 1929 and
January 1932 ten additional states enacted income tax legislation. This
sudden interest in income taxation by the states spurred President Hoover
and the secretary of the treasury to act under section 257 of the Revenue
Act of 1926 because overlapping taxation by the federal government and
the states was becoming increasingly significant. Id.
28. This problem is uniquely associated with the states. SUMMARY 2.
[Vol. III
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federal tax laws enjoyed greater respect than those of the states, 9
persuaded state tax officials to demand greater access to federal tax
information.3
0
The Revenue Act of 193411 provided for the attachment of a form
containing tax information 32 to an individual's federal tax return to
facilitate collection of state income taxes.3 This requirement, never
fully implemented, 34 was eliminated in 1935 by the "Costigan
Amendment,"53 which has remained virtually intact to the present.3 1
29. Id. at 2-3.
30. Id.
31. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 683.
32. These forms included the taxpayer's name, address, income, de-
ductions, credits, and tax liability information. Turner 959.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158.
36. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(b)(2): "State bodies or commis-
sions.-All income returns filed with respect to the taxes imposed by chap-
ters 1, 2, 3, and 6 (or copies thereof, if so prescribed by regulations made
under this subsection), shall be open to inspection by any official, body,
or commission, lawfully charged with the administration of any State tax
law, if the inspection is for the purpose of such administration or for the
purpose of obtaining information to be furnished to local taxing authorities
as provided in this paragraph. The inspection shall be permitted only upon
written request of the governor of such State, designating the representa-
tive of such official, body, or commission to make the inspection on behalf
of such official, body, or commission. The inspection shall be made in such
manner, and at such times and places, as shall be prescribed by regulations
made by the Secretary or his delegate. Any information thus secured by
any official, body, or commission of any State may be used only for the
administration of the tax laws of such State, except that upon written
request of the governor of such State any such information may be fur-
nished to any official, body, or commission of any political subdivision of
such State, lawfully charged with the administration of the tax laws of
such political subdivision, but may be furnished only for the' purpose of,
and may be used only for, the administration of such tax laws." The
criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure also remains substantially
unchanged. Id. § 7213(a)(2): "State employees-Any officer, employee, or
agent of any State or political subdivision, who divulges (except as author-
ized in section 6103 (b), or when called upon to testify in any judicial or
administrative proceeding to which the State or political subdivision, or
such State or local official, body, or commission, as such, is a party), or
5851975]
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In 1949 the Secretary of the Treasury sponsored a conference of
federal, state, and local representatives to devise a system for the
reciprocal flow of taxpayer information between the states and the
IRS.37 This meeting resulted in the implementation of formal in-
come tax audit agreements and the exchange of audit abstracts
between the IRS and the states. 8 Disproportionate benefits accrued
who makes known to any person in any manner whatever not provided by
law, any information acquired by him through an inspection permitted
him or another under section 6103 (b), or who permits any income return
or copy thereof or any book containing any abstracts or particulars thereof,
or any other information, acquired by him through an inspection permitted
him or another under section 6013 (b), to be seen or examined by any
person except as provided by law, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."
Following the enactment of the "Costigan Amendment" the need for spe-
cial state schedules persisted. In 1936 individuals had to file these sched-
ules once again. T.D. 4626, XV-1 Cum. Bull. 61 (1936). The use of the
schedules finally came to an end in 1940. T.D. 4989, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 97
(1940). During the period of 1935-40, state tax officials utilized several
methods of examining federal tax returns. In addition to an inspection of
the duplicates on file in field collection offices, some state officials also
purchased photostatic copies of returns at rates set by the IRS, others
bought copies of the IRS's audit adjustments, and finally, some went di-
rectly to Washington (and field offices after the IRS was decentralized) to
microfilm returns, manually prepare abstracts, and type public lists of
federal taxpayers. These various methods produced additional revenue
even if they were only used to identify federal taxpayers who had failed to
comply with state tax laws. The IRS did not actively foster the broadening
of this program since it was burdened by visiting officials, and any pay-
ments for its services went to the Department of the Treasury, not to the
IRS. SUMMARY 3. The introduction of a computer system has greatly in-
creased the states' ability to retrieve federal taxpayer information. Turner
960. For a good discussion of the introduction and use of data processing
hardware in Federal tax administration see Smith, Automation in Tax
Administration, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 751 (1969). See also Excerpts
from the 1973 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Related to Data Processing, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8750.
37. Turner 961.
38. Id. "The conferees agreed that the various agencies of government
should (1) exchange information as to audit plans and techniques; (2)
exchange audit findings on selected returns to reduce insofar as possible
[Vol. III
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to the states under these agreements; states, suffering from a
paucity of experienced auditors, were unable to match the volume
or revenue producing information provided to them by the IRS. 9
Furthermore, states reviewed the IRS information at virtually no
cost.4 0 Due to the disproportionate benefits enjoyed by the states
and the high costs incurred on the federal level, the IRS was not
enthusiastic about the program.4 Another cause for the retarded
growth of federal-state audit exchange agreements was the general
incompatability between federal and state income tax laws.4"
The initiative for strengthening the federal-state program came
in 1955 when the President's Committee on Intergovernmental Re-
lations (the Kesstenbaum Committee) endorsed administrative co-
operation as a vehicle for intergovernmental tax coordination. 3
New audit exchange agreements were tailored to the individual
tax structures of the respective states. The factors which give these
agreements the flexibility largely responsible for their wide accept-
ance are:
44
separate and repeated audits of the same taxpayer by the several agencies
of government. As a means of making that policy effective, it was recom-
mended that such information as is now available as to audit plans be
immediately exchanged between those agencies of government interested
in such an exchange; and, that 'pilot' exchanges of audit findings on se-
lected returns be exchanged during the year 1950 on a test basis in a
limited area. The Treasury Department agreed to an initiation of this
recommendation by making available to the interested States and local
governments a copy of its plans in respect to its audit program of individ-
ual income tax returns. Further, the Treasury will solicit the assistance of
one or two States to test, on a cooperative basis, an audit program for
Federal and State income tax returns." Turner at 961-62 n.11.
39. Id. at 962.
40. Id.
41. SUMMARY 3.
42. J. CHOMMIE, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 163 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as CHOMMIE].
43. SUMMARY 4.
44. The purpose of these agreements was to "permit more effective
deployment of income tax audit resources at both levels, avoid duplication
of effort, and safeguard taxpayers against the ordeal of repeated audits."
Id. at 3. The pilot program which included five states (Colorado, Ken-
tucky, Montana, North Carolina, and Wisconsin) failed to produce the
desired reciprocal effects. The participating states enthusiastically en-
19751
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
[Tihe Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the governor of the state agree
to authorize their subordinates to (1) establish mutual programs for exchang-
ing information on a reciprocal basis in order to secure returns, improve
enforcement efforts, determine tax liability and effect collection of tax from
persons subject to taxes in either jurisdiction, and (2) seek out any other
methods of cooperation which may be mutually agreeable.' 5
Studies46 indicate that these agreements have been beneficial.47
By maximizing the benefits of audit exchanges, the resultant avoid-
ance of duplication of work enhances the overall efficiency of the
dorsed the agreements but the IRS reacted as it had done during the 1940s
and failed to encourage the expansion of federal-state cooperation efforts.
Id. Between 1950 and 1955 Wisconsin collected an additional $3 million of
income taxes, penalties, and interest; at the end of one year Minnesota
reported additional income taxes of $860,000, and North Carolina almost
$1 million in additional taxes on a total of 6000 assessments. CHOMMIE 162.
In fiscal year 1960 the IRS attributed an additional $10.6 million in federal
tax revenue to the information which it obtained from state governments.
The estimated cost for the internal development of this would have been
$250,000, while the cost of furnishing information to the states was less
than $50,000. Furthermore, it is estimated that the states gain a total of
at least $10 million annually. SUMMARY 6. In 1962 information supplied by
twenty states and the District of Columbia increased federal delinquent
tax collections by $22 million. In calendar year 1964 the information from
the states yielded an additional $7 million in assessments of deficiencies.
Another 1964 survey of eighteen participating states and the District of
Columbia indicated that federal information was responsible for an addi-
tional $25 million in tax deficiencies. Turner 964. Public consciousness of
the programs will significantly deter tax evasion, and moreover, studies do
not reflect the present value of future tax collections resulting from the
improved enforcement process. SUMMARY 6.
45. Turner 963.
46. See, e.g., Chommie 163.
47. The disparity in benefits from these agreements has dissipated over
time as the gap between the IRS' audit capacity and that of the states
narrowed. Id. at 164. The quality of state income tax audit statistics are
no longer the motivation behind these agreements. The IRS recognizes
that some potentially useful data may be procured from sundry state lists,
such as, names and addresses of workers covered under state unemploy-
ment insurance programs. SUMMARY 4. For an illustrative checklist of po-




system and reduces the marginal costs of collecting delinquent tax
dollars.
III. The Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972
Amidst the fanfare surrounding the signing of the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (Revenue Sharing Act),' 8 an important
provision was overlooked and remains dormant. Title II of the Reve-
nue Sharing Act, the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972
(Collection Act),49 amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
provide for the piggybacking of certain state individual income
taxes onto the federal tax.50
Structural differences in personal income taxation on the three
levels of government has caused problems in our federal system.
Piggybacking requires a waiver of the concurrent jurisdiction in the
personal income tax base; participating states surrender their per-
sonal income tax policy-making powers5 and adopt federal law. 2
With increased uniformity of federal and state personal income tax
laws,53 the federal government absorbs the responsibility of collec-
tion and enforcement of the state tax.54
Once a state becomes a participant in the piggyback system,55 the
48. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-63 (Supp. II, 1972); see note 6 supra. For a
discussion of the fanfare surrounding the signing of Revenue Sharing, see
Stolz 1.
49. Pub. L. No. 92-512 (Oct. 20, 1972), 86 Stat. 945.
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6361-65.
51. See text accompanying notes 63-80 infra.
52. Id.
53. At the time of consideration of the Act twenty-eight states out of
forty-one with general income taxes had adopted the federal tax base. S.
REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972).
54. Id. By encouraging standardization of tax laws piggybacking will
reduce the costs of administration. Presently, under various state tax laws
special administrators are required for each system due to the divergence
in state income tax laws. Piggybacking will permit the states to share in
the efficiency of the federal government in tax collection. The difference
in efficiency is partly due to "the larger size of the Federal operation and
the greater uniformity of its jurisdiction appear to provide economies of
scale." Id. at 19.
55. To participate in the piggyback system a state must enter into an
agreement with the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, who will
1975]
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federat government will collect all qualified state individual in-
comes taxes and transfer them to the states within three business
days after they have been deposited in a Federal Reserve Bank.56 A
taxpayer has the right to contest his state's, individual income tax
liability in the same manner as he can challenge his federal income
tax liability.57 The federal government will represent the states in
all judicial and administrative proceedings except suits involving a
state's constitution" and proceedings involving the relationship be-
determine whether the state has a qualified individual income tax plan,
and will convey the finding to the governor of the applying state within
sixty days. Id. § 6363(a). This agreement must be in effect during the
taxable period in which the federal government will collect the electing
state's taxes. Id. § 6362(f)(1). The determination of whether the state has
a qualified plan is made without regard to section 6362(f)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, which requires that such an agreement be in exist-
ence if a tax is to be a qualified one. Id. If the state's tax plan does not
qualify, the state has sixty days from the notice of the rejection to file a
petition for review in the appropriate federal court of appeals. Id. §
6363(d)(1). This judicial proceeding is granted a preference under the Act
and shall be heard and resolved as expeditiously as possible. Id. §
6363(d)(4). A state may withdraw from the system by notifying the Secre-
tary or his delegate, or by enacting a substantive change in its tax law
which impairs the law's qualified status. Id. § 6363(b).
56. Id. § 6361(c)(1). Criminal penalties must also be transferred within
thirty days of their receipt even though they are not treated as tax collec-
tions. Congress expects that transfers will be made more quickly than the
Act requires to the extent that the IRS' resources allow, and an estimation
process may be utilized to provide for the faster flow of such transfers.
GENERAL EXPLANATION 54. Adjustments must be made at least once each
fiscal year on account of the difference arising from the use of estimated
collections. Id. § 6361(c)(2). Any difference between the total withholding
and the taxpayer's total individual income tax liability will be divided
between the accounts on the basis of the required amounts which had to
be paid. Id. § 6361(d) (2). If, for example, $5100 was collected for a taxpayer
who had a state income tax liability of $800 and a federal income tax
liability of $4000, the state tax is one-sixth of the total tax liability. The
refund will be allocated between the state and federal government in ac-
cordance with the one to six ratio. Therefore, the state will receive $50 and
the federal government will receive $250.
57. Id. § 6361(b).
58. Id. § 6361(d)(1)(B)(i). If a state court obtains jurisdiction because
of a state constitutional issue or an issue arising from the relationship
[Vol. III
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tween the United States and a state. 59
The Collection Act amended section 6405 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (concerning reports of certain refunds or credits to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation) 0 so qualified state
individual income taxes for a taxable year shall be treated as a
portion of a refund or credit for the federal income tax liability for
that year.6 The amendment also increases the jurisdictional
amount for small cases in the Tax Court from $1,000 to $1,500, to
accomodate additional disputes.2
A. Qualified Resident Taxes
To qualify under the Collection Act, a state tax must be based
on federal taxable income or federal tax liability. 3 A tax based on
between the state and the federal government it does not retain jurisdic-
tion to determine the tax liability unless the court would otherwise have
jurisdiction, "as might occur where the suit involves title to property
clouded by tax liens." GENERAL EXPLANATION 53. State inspectors have
access to tax returns and information but they can not proceed against the
taxpayer for any liability. GENERAL EXPLANATION 53.
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6361(d)(1)(B)(ii). The laws of a
participating state must not provide any criminal or civil penalties with
respect to a qualified tax other than those which a taxpayer is subject to
under federal law. By omitting an item on both forms, for example, a
taxpayer is subject to two separate impositions of the appropriate federal
sanction-one by the federal government and the other by the state gov-
ernment. Id. § 6362(f)(6).
60. Id. § 6405(e).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 7463(a).
63. Participating states may determine their own tax rates under both
types of qualified resident taxes. Taxes based on federal taxable income
may include progressive or proportional rates. GENERAL EXPLANATION 55.
Taxes based on a percentage of federal tax liability must be levied at a
uniform rate, thereby providing the state tax the same degree of progressiv-
ity as offered by the federal tax. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(c)(1).
64. By minimizing the diversity in the participants' tax laws Congress
hopes the process will operate simply as if the number of federal individual
income tax returns had been proportionately increased. Federal taxable
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federal taxable income of residents must adhere to the federal defi-
nition of such income. 4 A state income tax based upon a percentage
of an individual's federal income tax liability must be adjusted to
eliminate state income taxes on income derived from obligations of
the United States. 5 Adjustments to augment state tax'revenues by
adding both federal deductions for state income taxes and income
from state and municipal obligations, which was exempt from fed-
eral income taxes, are permitted."
B. Qualified Nonresident Taxes
A state tax on wages and other business income of nonresident
individuals derived from sources within the levying state must meet
several tests in order to utilize the enforcement resources of the IRS.
First, the taxing state must have a qualified resident income tax"7
in effect while imposing a tax on nonresidents' income derived from
sources within the stateA This tax may not be applied against non-
resident individuals who derive less than 25 percent of their total
wage and business income within the state.A9 An additional require-
ment prevents a state from taxing the income of nonresidents to a
greater extent than income of residents. 0
income must be adjusted to (1) remove interest on obligations of the
United States which is taxable under federal individual income tax laws,
(2) add any federal deductions for state income taxes, and (3) add the net
income from state and municipal obligations which is exempt from federal
income taxes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(b)(1). Permitted adjustments
allow states to impose a minimum tax on tax preferences and allow credits
for income taxes paid to another state or a political subdivision of a state.
Id. § 6362(b)(2). The computation of this credit must be in accordance
with rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.
GENERAL EXPLANATION 57.
65. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(c)(2).
66. Id. The tax based on a percentage of federal income tax liability,
like the qualified resident tax based on federal taxable income, will not fail
solely because of a credit for state and local income taxes paid to another
state. Id. § 6362(c)(4). This credit must be computed in accordance with
rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. Id.
67. Id. § 6362(d)(1)(E).
68. Id. § 6362(d)(1)(A).
69. Id. § 6362(d)(1)(C).
70. Id. § 6363(d)(1)(D). A nonresident taxpayer is limited by the ratio
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In authorizing collection of nonresident taxes on income derived
from sources within the state, Congress permits participating states
to maximize the breadth of their income tax bases." The various
limitations in the statute72 minimize the administrative burden
upon the IRS and assure uniformity of state income tax laws.
of his wages and other business income to his adjusted gross income when
determining the allowable deductions against his wages and other business
income derived from sources within the state. Id. See also GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION 60. It is expected that as to the computation of the state tax
on nonresidents the IRS will issue a regulation providing for an adjustment
for all business expenses related to the production of wages which are
subtracted from gross income. Moreover, the regulation should permit all
allowable deductions for the purpose of determining whether nonresidents
are bearing a disproportionate burden of the tax. Id. Generally, all income
derived from sources within a state are expected to pass a test requiring
that the labor which yielded the income was performed in the levying state.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(d)(1)(B).
71. GENERAL EXPLANATION 60.
72. A state must adhere to eight additional requirements before income
tax will be collected by the federal government. First, the laws of a partici-
pating state must incorporate all future changes in the federal individual
income tax for the effective period of the agreement. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 6362(f)(2) (A). Second, state laws must be amended to provide that
any changes made by the state in its qualified tax law during a taxable
year which coincides with a calendar year, will only apply to the current
taxable year unless the change is enacted before November 1. If Congress
initiated a change in a state's qualified tax law this requirement is waived
to the extent of the congressional alteration. Id. § 6362(f)(2)(B). Third,
participating states may not impose any tax on the income of individuals
other than (1) a qualified resident tax, (2) a qualified nonresident tax, and
(3) a separate tax on the investment income received or accrued by individ-
uals domiciled within the state but not residents of that state according
to the residency rules previously set forth. This latter tax is ineligible for
federal collection. Id. § 6362(f)(3). See also GENERAL EXPLANATION 64.
Fourth, the taxable year of individuals under the qualified state taxes
must be the same as their taxable year for federal income taxes. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 6362(f)(4). Fifth, a married taxpayer who files a joint
return for federal income tax purposes may not file a separate return for
the state tax, and a married taxpayer filing a separate return for federal
tax purposes may not file a joint return for the state tax. Id. § 6362(f)(5).
Sixth, state treatment of income derived from conduits must be the same
as the federal treatment of income from these sources. Conduits include
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C. Residence
Since a high level of uniformity of state and federal tax laws is
essential for the successful operation of piggybacking, the diverse
residency definitions of states were a major obstacle in the uninhi-
bited flow of the system. Congress decided that it was necessary for
all states entering the program to adopt a uniform residency defini-
tion.73 In establishing the uniform residency rule, Congress sought
to strike a balance between the administrative problems caused by
frequent changes in a taxpayer's residency status and "the potential
partnerships and partners, trusts and their beneficiaries, subchapter S
corporations and their shareholders, and any other entity and individual
having a beneficial interest therein which is treated as a conduit for the
taxes imposed by Chapter 1 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954. Id. § 6362(f)(7).
This section avoids differences in double taxation by states and the federal
government. It is unclear, however, whether this provision prohibits a state
from administering an independent tax on conduits. If states are not per-
mitted to enact independent legislation, states which now tax unincorpor-
ated businesses or subchapter S corporations will suffer a loss of revenue
by entering the piggyback system. Seventh, state law must not diminish
any relief provided to a member of the armed forces guaranteed by 50
U.S.C. § 574 (App. 1970) (Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940).
Id. § 6362(f)(8). Under section 574 a serviceman will not lose or acquire a
residence strictly because of military orders. For the purpose of a qualified
tax, a member of the armed forces is not a resident or domiciliary of a state
because his absence from his original domicile or residence as a result of
being under military orders. GENERAL EXPLANATION 67. Compensation for
military service is not deemed to be derived from sources within a state of
which the individual is neither a resident nor a domiciliary. This excep-
tion, however, does not apply to nonmilitary income received by such a
taxpayer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(f)(8). Eighth, a particpating
state's law must not contravene the provisions of 49 U.S.C. §§ 27, 325(a),
923 (Interstate Commerce Act) or 29 U.S.C. § 1512 (Federal Aviation Act
of 1958) with respect to withholding liability to the extent that these laws
apply to the nonresident tax. These sections prohibit the withholding of
any compensation of employees of an interstate carrier unless more than
50% of the individual's compensation from the employing carrier in the
prior calendar year was earned in the levying state. If more than 50% of
the compensation was not earned in a single state then withholding is only
required by the state of the employee's residence. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6362(f)(9). See also GENERAL EXPLANATION 67.
73. GENERAL EXPLANATION 60-61.
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for manipulation that a long time period State residency rule might
provide." 4
Individuals may find themselves being residents of more than one
state under the Collection Act's various tests. Instead of arbitrarily
authorizing a taxpayer to pay only one tax to a given state, Congress
decided that the most equitable solution would be to allocate an
individual's income on the basis of the amount of time the taxpayer
resided in each state. 5 Although this process simplifies the alloca-
tion of an individual's income tax liability where such individual is
a resident of more than one piggybacking state, the Collection Act
does not offer any relief where the individual is a resident of both
piggybacking and non-piggybacking states. Conflicts. between the
taxing jurisdictions will continue under such circumstances.
74. Id. at 61. The purpose of this uniform residency requirement is to
curtail the present situation where a taxpayer may evade the state income
taxes of state A by asserting that he is a resident of state B, and conversely,
maintaining that he is a resident of state A while attempting to circumvent
the taxing authority of state B. Id. An individual is treated as a resident
of the levying state for a taxable year only if his principal place of residence
has been within the state for at least 135 consecutive days and a minimum
of thirty days of that period are in the same taxable year. A nonresident
who does not meet the requirements with respect to the taxable year and
is domiciled in the state for at least 30 days during the taxable year
will also be treated as a resident. The 30 days need not be consecutive for
purposes of determining a taxpayer's domicile. A citizen or resident of the
United States who fails to meet the above residency test should be taxed
as a resident of the state where he is domiciled provided that he meets the
30 day test. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6362(e)(1)(A)-(B) with
GENERAL EXPLANATION 61.
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(e)(4). The residency rules will also
affect withholding deductions and declarations of estimated income. A
resident under the Act, subject to a qualified resident tax, is liable for the
payment due under either withholding or estimated tax provisions if he
reasonably expects to reside in the state for 30 days. An individual is
considered to be subject to a nonresident tax if he reasonably expects to
receive wages and other business income during the taxable year. The
Secretary or his delegate may provide for the proper integration of state
and federal withholding by prescribing withholding rates. An employer is
compelled to furnish an employee with a withholding statement, similar
to the federal W-2 form, for any state tax withheld. Compare INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 6362(e)(4)-(5) with GENERAL EXPLANATION 63.
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D. Estates and Trusts
An individual's estate is considered a resident of the last state of
which the decedent was a resident.7" Wide variations in state treat-
ment of trusts spurred Congress to construct this uniform residency
rule." A testamentary trust is treated as a resident of the last state
in which the deceased settlor was a resident." The residence of an
inter vivos trust is the state in which the principal contributor was
a resident for the longest period of time during the three year period
immediately preceding the trust's creation.79 If a trust has more
than one residence or no residence under these rules, its residence
is to be determined under principles prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury or his delegate.0
IV. Analysis of the Federal Legislation
As seen by Congress, the system's advantages include: (1) more
effective administration of federal and state income tax laws; (2) a
reduction of the average costs of administration of state tax laws;
(3) tax simplification; (4) significant increases in state tax reve-
nues."'
States should initially gain revenue because federal regulations
have substantially shortened the time within which an employer
must deposit income taxes withheld from employees.8"
More effective administration of federal and state individual in-
come tax laws can be attained by reducing processing costs. 3 En-
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(e)(2).
77. GENERAL EXPLANATION 61-62.
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(e)(3)(A).
79. Id. § 6362(e)(3)(B). The principle contributor is the individual who
contributed the assets with the highest fair market value at the time of the
creation of the trust. Id. § 6362(e)(3)(C)(ii). If subsequent contributions
are made the highest fair market value of assets conveyed is determined
as of the date of their receipt. GENERAL EXPLANATION 62.
80. GENERAL EXPLANATION 62.
81. The total value of the corpus is to be equal to the sum of the fair
market value of all contributions at the time of contribution. Id.
82. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972).
83. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TAX ADMINIS-
TRATORS (NATA), FEDERAL COLLECTION OF STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES




forcement activities, however, would remain unaffected by the
Collection Act. The IRS could not increase its audits of returns, 4
and current federal-state cooperation prevents significant overlap-
ping of enforcement activities. 5
Reduction in state court case loads can be considered a reduction
of administrative costs. However, the number of state income tax
cases in proportion to the total case load in state courts does not
appear significant,88 and most, if not all, of this state tax litigation
will have to be absorbed by the federal system. 7 While many states
presently rely upon federal tax precedents and rulings, 8 the states'
power to modify these decisions would be lost under the Collection
Act.
The statute does not preempt a state's policymaking authority
over its individual income tax laws. 8 It merely limits the taxes that
the federal government will collect for a state. 0 States may utilize
84. The Act makes no additional appropriations to the IRS.
85. NATA REPORT 17-18.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id. This is true except in cases involving either state constitutional
issues or the relationship between the state and the federal government.
See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
88. Almost all of the states use federal decisions and regulations in
interpreting the provisions of their individual income taxes. N.J. Tax Pol-
icy Comm. REP. PART V: NON-PROPERTY TAXES IN A FAIR AND EQUITABLE TAX
SYSTEM 81 (1972). The reason for their widespread use stems from the
adoption of federal adjusted gross income or federal taxable income, with
modifications, as the starting point for computing an individual's state
income tax liability. NATA REPORT 19. Thirty-six states presently use
federal definitions as their computational starting points for their individ-
ual income taxes. Most of these states also follow the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 when it is not in conflict with existing state law. See 1 P-H
STATE & LOCAL TAXES 1002 (1974). A savings would result, however,
where one action under the Act would replace two separate ones, as exists
under present law. If the state tax does not complicate the return in such
a way as to require additional utilization of judicial resources, the Act
could make drastic inroads in terms of efficiency. However, since the state
caseload is light this increased efficiency must be evaluated in terms of a
state's surrender of control over both the judicial and legislative policy
implications of its individual income tax. NATA REPORT 18-19.
89. GENERAL EXPLANATION 51.
90. See notes 63-72 supra and accompanying text.
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tax credits, which would otherwise disqualify the tax for piggyback-
ing, if the credits are separately administered by the state.' Un-
fortunately, the maintenance of such a direct payment system re-
quires personnel and equipment which would diminish the savings
achieved by federal collection. This problem will confront any state
that chooses to impose forms of income taxation other than the
basic qualified taxes.
Tax simplification is another goal of the Collection Act. Since
most states already use federal definitions as the starting point for
computing state taxable income,93 simplification for taxpayers filing
in only one state would be minimal. 4 Filing in two or more states
by a nonresident should be simpler under the Act. 5 Employers will
have to deal with one set of withholding requirements; however, the
employers must adjust their cash flow to meet faster deposit regula-
tions."
A substantial increase in state tax revenues through piggybacking
91. GENERAL EXPLANATION 57-58. A compendium of credits to state per-
sonal income taxes may be found in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FINANCE: SIGNIFI-
CANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 276-79 (1973-74 ed.).
92. See text accompanying note 81 supra. The tax simplification may
defeat Congress' goal of minimizing the administrative burden on the IRS.
First, the IRS must separate withholding reports for nonresidents because
the tax must be withheld if the individual reasonably expects to earn
income in a state for thirty days or more. Second, residency requirements
permit an individual to be a resident of more than one state. These returns
would have to be separated manually. NATA REPORT 24-25.
93. See note 88 supra.
94. NATA REPORT 22-23.
95. Id. at 23.
96. GENERAL EXPLANATION 54. Generally, states require monthly depos-
its while federal regulations demand weekly deposits. Since the Act re-
quires state withholding taxes to be transferred to the state within three
business days from the employer's deposit, it is expected that faster collec-
tions will provide a one-time windfall because weekly transfers will include
some amounts which would have been collected by the state in the follow-
ing fiscal year under present law. The increase in the flow of revenue to
the states will vary according to the present withholding regulations in
each state. The increase in a state's cash flow, however, could be realized
by changing present state withholding requirements. NATA REPORT 20-22.
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is doubtful. 7 However, an increase in revenues could occur where a
taxpayer had previously evaded state taxes but complied with fed-
eral tax law. Under piggybacking a taxpayer must comply with both
tax laws since they will be reported on the same form."
The National Association of Tax Administrators (NATA) has iso-
lated four possible disadvantages of the Collection Act: (1) a state's
loss of flexibility in determining its own tax program,9 (2) the Act's
effect on state autonomy,' °0 (3) fiscal problems due to state constitu-
tional requirements for a balanced budget,'"' and (4) piggybacking's
adverse consequences on the availability of various revenue data.,02
A state's loss of flexibility in determining its own tax program and
the Collection Act's effect on state autonomy are interrelated. Cer-
tain prerogatives associated with a sovereign which devises and
administers its own income tax will be surrendered.' 3 States must
analyze the trade-off between political autonomy and economic in-
dependence in determining the desirability of piggybacking. States
will have access to a broad-based tax that will yield significant
revenue at a lower cost than the state could achieve acting alone.' 4
Piggybacking's return of unrestricted funds and the broad federal
revenue base capable of yielding significant funds with slight rate
increases' 5 reinforce federalism by providing states with the means
for fiscal responsibility. Many localities are already "economic vas-
sals" of the federal government' 8 and it is probable that piggyback-
ing will not worsen their fiscal plight.
97. NATA REPORT 21. But see GENERAL EXPLANATION 51, 54.
98. Simonetti, Washington Report, New Tax Legislation: Piggyback
Rides, Bows and Arrows, and Other Diversion, 4 TAX ADVISER 36, 37 (1973).




103. See note 55 supra.
104. GENERAL EXPLANATION 17-18.
105. See note 15 supra.
106. Professor Edward C. Banfield of the University of Pennsylvania,
who is author of The Unheavenly City, also sees the cities in a broad
decline. President Nixon's "new federalism" was a variation on "Vietnam-
ization." Mr. Banfield says: "[A] way for the Federal Government to put
the responsibility on other people, the villagers in effect, without really
removing themselves from control." Lydon, In Big Cities, Realistic Voters
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Certain states may encounter constitutional problems in entering
into agreements requiring the adoption of federal individual income
tax laws. A major consideration is the constitutional requirement of
many states for a balanced budget.' °7 The fiscal uncertainty pro-
duced by a potential federal tax cut late in a year could seriously
decrease a state's expected revenues and make it difficult to project
a balanced budget. A possible solution would be for Congress to rule
out any tax law changes beyond the date when states could adjust
their rates to reflect the new modifications.'"'
Finally, states have a vital interest in maintaining certain infor-
mation obtained from individual income tax returns,'09 particularly
to assist them in estimating future revenues. Under the Collection
Act, states can continue to receive supporting schedules to a tax-
payer's federal return"0 so that necessary information would still be
accessible."' The Act simply divorces the administration of the
state's individual income tax from the receipt of cash. Records",
would continue to be maintained by the states."I3 Those states which
in This Election Year Are Aware of How Limited Are Mayors'Powers, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1975, at 17, col.1.
107. NATA REPORT 35. The state constitutional problems in prescrip-
tive adoption of federal income tax law are considered in Comment,
Constitutionality of a Federalized State Income Tax, 1963 Wis. L. REV.
445. See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FEDERAL-STATE COORDINATION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAXES 153-66 (1965).
The additional costs incurred in projecting state revenue must be set-off
against any savings from the federal collection in evaluating the efficiency
of the system.
108. A state may make a change in the base or rate of a qualified tax
before November 1 of the calendar year for which the tax is collected.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6362(f)(2)(B).
i09. NATA REPORT 35-36.
110. Simonetti, Washington Report, New Tax Legislation: Piggyback
Rides, Bows and Arrows, and Other Diversions, 4 TAX ADVISER 36, 37
(1973).
111. These schedules would have to conform to the federal individual
income tax returns in order to facilitate the operation of the system by the
IRS.
112. These records would include the schedules and tax records for
state taxes other than individual income taxes.
113. If a state chooses to enact a direct payment system of credits or 6
tax on investment income of domiciliaries (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
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utilize tax returns to provide somewhat bizzare information"4 will
have to develop alternative means of procuring such data."'
These difficulties underscore the NATA disagreement with the
congressional finding that "a significant increase of State tax reve-
nue should result from consolidation of the administration of Fed-
eral and State income taxes.""' While NATA concedes thatcertain
savings in processing costs may be realized, the same cannot be said
for enforcement costs."7 Since the Collection Act does not provide
increased resources for the IRS and present cooperative efforts be-
tween the states and the IRS have been unsuccessful," ' NATA be-
lieves the deleterious effects of decreasing total audit man-hours is
far too great a price for an insignificant reduction in processing
costs. ",
However, at a 1974 meeting of NATA, William W. Williams,
Deputy Commissioner of the IRS, remarked: "[w]e do believe . . .
that we can collect State revenues more efficiently and economi-
cally than the States . . .because of the economies of a large scale
operation such as ours."'2
V. Conclusions
Once the Treasury Department promulgates the regulations nec-
essary to implement the Collection Act, each state can evaluate any
potential savings."2 ' Present resistance stems from the natural con-
viction of state legislators and tax administrators that they can
administer an individual income tax as well as the federal govern-
6362(f) (3) (C)) it will be necessary to maintain certain records. The mainte-
nance of these records, however, will infringe upon the elimination of du-
plicate administrative efforts.
114. For several examples, see NATA REPORT 35-36.
115. Id. at 35.
116. S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 (1972).
117. NATA REPORT 17-18.
118. Id.
119. NATA prefers federal cost sharing of state individual income tax
auditand collection programs. NATA REPORT 47-49.
120. Remarks of William E. Williams, Deputy Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, prepared for delivery before the NATA. Portland, Ore., June
3, 1974, 9 CCH 1974 STAND. TAX REP. 8751, at 76,007.
121. NATA REPORT 27.
19751
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III
ment.'22 This reasoning overlooks a significant by-product of the
Act-total integration of the different levels of government sharing
the same tax base.12
Piggybacking has been utilized in the past'24-the piggybacking
of local sales taxes on state sales taxes is widespread.' 5 Maryland 2 6
and Indiana'S/employ piggybacking in the collection of state and
county personal income taxes.' 28 Other states offer their localities
additional piggyback options.'29 While piggybacking may impinge
state autonomy in political terms, it strengthens its econonmic free-
dom. The potential for increased state financing would assist elect-
ing states to solve their economic problems on the state level.
A state has the option of participating in the program and can
always leave the system when it desires. 3 0 Even when participating,
a state retains certain flexibility in determining the type and rates
of individual income tax imposed and in developing its own system
of direct payment credits outside the state income tax.'3 '
122. L. ECKER-RACZ, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF STATE-LOCAL
FINANCE 160 (1970).
123. See generally G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 36-67 (1967).
124. Piggybacking is an important feature of local finance in
Scandinavian countries. Id. at 36 n.12. Canada has had great success with
piggybacking the provincial income taxes. J. STRICK, CANADIAN PUBLIC
FINANCE 100-07 (1973).
125. G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 37 (1967). For a listing of states collecting local sales taxes, see
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL-STATE-
LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 84-89 (1973-
74 ed.).
126. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 283 (Supp. 1974).
127. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-3.5-1-1 to -1-12 (Burns Supp. 1974).
128. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has
included a piggyback county income tax in their uniform personal income
tax statute. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1970
CUMULATIVE ACIR STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, § 15-62-21, at 46-47 (1969).
129. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM 84-89 (1973-74 ed.).
130. See note 55 supra.
131. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
Piggybacking will likewise facilitate the central management of
the personal income tax base.' 3 This is a desirable goal where there
is multi-governmental utilization of the same tax base. The re-
sources spent by the federal government to improve the equity and
efficiency of the personal income tax would effectuate a national tax
policy whose benefits would inure to all states participating in the
piggyback system. State tax reform legislation could achieve similar
goals, but previous performance has shown that while "[t]he spirit
is . . . willing, the flesh is weak."' 133
If successful in income taxation, piggybacking systems may be
designed in other areas of tax overlapping between the various levels
of government and thus increase the reduction in the cost of collect-
ing taxes.3 4 The Collection Act's potential for tax reform and revi-
talizing a state's revenue structure could be the impetus to unshac-
kle the states from their fiscal impotence.
Nicholas J. Letizia
132. See generally G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FIscAL RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 33-50 (1967); L. ECKER-RAcZ, THE POLrICS AND Eco-
NOMICS OF STATE-LOCAL FINANCES 159-64 (1970).
133. Matthew 26:41. The states, historically, were content in seeing
that the overall tax structure was progressive. Attempts to approve the
progressivity of state and local taxes is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Rothenberg, New Look in State Finances: Tax Reduction and Restruc-
tured Tax Systems, 27 NAT. TAX J. 175,178 (1974). See also Crooks,
Replacing Unfair State Taxes: Income Taxes as an Alternative, PEOPLE &
TAXES, Nov. 1974, at 6, col. 1; Reinhold, States Shift From Property Tax
in Bid to Equalize School Funds, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1975, at 39, col. 1.
For an exhaustive examination of the incidence of taxes in the United
States, see J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? (1974).
New Jersey has been attempting to reform its tax structure in recent years.
See [1972] N.J. TAX POLICY COMM. REP. (1972).
'134. Piggybacking has been suggested as the means of collecting state
value added taxes. Special Comm. on the Value-Added Tax of the Tax
Section, American Bar Association, Technical Problems in Designing a
Broad-Based Value-Added Tax for the United States, 28 TAX LAW. 193, 219
(1975).
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